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Symposium
Physician-Assisted Suicide:
Facing Death After Glucksberg and Quill
Foreword: Facing Death
Susan M.Wolf*
Last term the U.S. Supreme Court finally considered the
constitutional status of physician-assisted suicide.' Confronted
with decisions from the Ninth and Second Circuits finding a
constitutional right, the Court granted certiorari in October
1996.2 That set off an explosion of debate. From the hospital
bedside to the legislative hearing room and evening news, the
country was riveted by an issue of clear and personal importance.
This debate was a long time coming. The ancient Hippocratic commitment to "give no deadly drug, even if asked"3 has
been challenged through the eons.4 But a sharp upsurge in
American discussion began in the late 1980s. JAMA's 1988
publication of an anonymous account of a resident performing
* Associate Professor of Law and Medicine, University of Minnesota
Law School, and Faculty Member, Center for Bioethics, University of Minnesota. A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Yale Law School. Thanks to Ryan
Johnson for able research assistance.
The contributors to this symposium presented their views at a panel discussion held at the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) 1998 annual
meeting. That panel was sponsored by the AALS Section on Law, Medicine
and Health Care. The University of Minnesota Center for Bioethics graciously contributed support for the panel and symposium.
1. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), revog Compassion
in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev' 49 F.3d
586 (9th Cir. 1995), revog 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994); Vacco v. Quill,
117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997), revg 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), revg Quill v. Koppel,
870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
2. Glucksberg, cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996); Quill, cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 36 (1996).
3. See Leon R. Kass, Neither for Love nor Money: Why DoctorsMust Not
Kill, PUB. INT., Winter 1989, at 25.
4. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Euthanasia:Historical,Ethical, and Empiric
Perspectives,154 ARCH. INTERNAL IED. 1890 (1994).
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euthanasia,5 Jack Kevorkian's defiant campaign of assisted
suicides starting in 1990,6 Derek Humphrey's 1991 issuance of
FinalExit,7 and Timothy Quill's 1991 recounting of an assisted
suicide in the New EnglandJournalof Medicine' all intensified
the public dialogue.
Suddenly we were paying closer attention to the Netherlands,
where a series of court decisions beginning in 1973 condoned
assisted suicide and active voluntary euthanasia After formulating guidelines and then passing legislation to encourage
physicians to report the practice, the Dutch practice was firmly
established.'" And to their great credit, they began rigorous
empirical study of that practice in 1990." The Northern Territory of Australia legitimated euthanasia, too, through legalization in 1995, but the federal parliament struck down the
legislation in 1997.2
These developments emboldened assisted suicide supporters
to seek legislative change. Though suicide had long been decriminalized, assistance in suicide had not.'3 The majority of

5. Anonymous, It's Over,Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988).
6. See Lisa Belldn, Doctor Tells of FirstDeath Using His Suicide Device,
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1990, at Al.
7. DEREK HUMPHREY, FINAL EXIT: THE PRAcTICALITIES OF SELFDELIVERANCE AND ASSISTED SUICIDE FOR THE DYING (1991).
8. Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity-A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991).
9. See, e.g., Henk A.M.J. ten Have, Euthanasiain the Netherlands: The
Legal Context and the Cases, 1 HEC FORUM 41 (1989); John Griffiths, The
Regulation of Euthanasiaand Related Medical Procedures that Shorten Life
in the Netherlands, 1 MED. L. INVL 137 (1994); Johan Legemaate, Legal Aspects of Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands, 1973-1994, 4
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 112 (1995).
10. See MARGARET PABST BATTIN, A Dozen Caveats Concerningthe Discussion of Euthanasia in the Netherlands, in THE LEAST WORST DEATH 130-32
(1994); John Griffiths, Recent Developments in the Netherlands Concerning
Euthanasiaand Other Medical Behavior that Shortens Life, 1 MED. L. INT'L
347 (1995).
1L See, e.g., P.J. van der Maas et al., Euthanasiaand Other Medical Decisions Concerningthe End of Life, 22 HEALTH PoL'Y 1 (1992); Gerrit van der
Wal & Robert J.M. Dillman, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 308 BRIT. MED.
J. 1346 (1994).
12. See Christopher James Ryan & Miranda Kaye, Euthanasiain Australia-The Northern Territory Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, 334 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 326 (1996); EuthanasiaLaw Struck Down in Australia, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 1997, at A15.
13. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2263-67 (1997); 2
ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT To DIE 454-55 (2d ed. 1995).
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states had retained criminal prohibitions. 4 But three western
states soon became the site of campaigns to remove state bans
through ballot initiatives. California voters rejected such initiatives in 1988 and 1992 and Washington State voters did the
same in 1991."5 Oregon voters, however, passed an initiative in
1994, making Oregon the first state formally to permit assisted
suicide. 6 The new statute, permitting assistance by lethal pre7 was immediately
scription,
plunged into several years of liti8
gation.
It was in this atmosphere that two cases began making
their way to the Supreme Court. Compassion in Dying v.
Washington was filed in January 1994 by the named organization together with physicians and patients. They claimed that
Washington State's ban on assisted suicide violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of liberty and equal protection
insofar as that ban applied to competent, terminally ill adults.
Across the country a group of physicians and terminal patients
brought a parallel suit in July, challenging New York's statute
prohibiting assisted suicide on the same grounds.
The federal district courts initially hearing these constitutional challenges came to opposing conclusions. In Quill the
court granted summary judgment to defendants, dismissing
the action. 9 But in Compassion in Dying the court ruled for
plaintiffs, finding the state ban an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty."0 The seriousness of these challenges to state
bans became even clearer on appeal. Although a three-judge

14. See MEISEL, supra note 13, at 78-79 (Supp. 1997).
15. See Judith F. Daar, Direct Democracy and Boethical Choices: Voting
Life and Death at the Ballot Box, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 799, 802-04 & n.14
(1995).

16. See id. at 803-04.
17. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.810-.897 (Supp. 1996).
18. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995), vacated and remanded, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub noam. Lee v. Harcleroad, 118
S. Ct. 328 (1997). Other obstacles to effectuating the statute were a legislative
demand for a popular re-vote, resulting in a November 1997 reaffirmation of
the original vote, and federal threats to prosecute physicians who issued lethal
prescriptions under the statute. See William Claiborne & Thomas B. Edsall,
Affirmation of Oregon Suicide Law May Spur Movement, WASH. POsT, Nov. 6,
1997, at A19; Timothy Eagan, Threatfrom Washington Has ChillingEffect on
Oregon Law Allowing Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997, at A18.
But see Justice Dept. Bars Punishing Oregon Doctors Aiding Suicides, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 24, 1998, at A.
19. 870 F. Supp. 78.
20. 850 F. Supp. 1454.
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panel of the Ninth Circuit first reversed the district court in
the Compassion case,2' the circuit court en banc then switched
course. In a lengthy opinion, the court ruled that the state ban
deprived patients of liberty in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's liberty guarantee.' One month later the Second
Circuit similarly found New York's ban unconstitutional,
though on different grounds, embracing an equal protection
rationale, rather than due process.' Thus by the summer of
1996 the two most populous states in the country 4 had seen
their bans on assisted suicide struck down. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
For the first time the Court was face-to-face with the
question of whether individual citizens should be able deliberately to cause death. The capital punishment cases had involved state-inflicted death after lengthy and public process.
The Cruzan case in 1990 had involved state refusal to terminate life-sustaining treatmentY Though some interpreted
terminating treatment as deliberately causing death, many
others and a majority of the Court itself saw it as honoring a
patient's wish to be free of unwanted bodily invasion, allowing
nature to take its course.26 The two assisted suicide cases, on
the other hand, were unmistakable. These were about physicians deliberately giving patients the means to kill themselves.
Debate was polarized. Proponents of assisted suicide
claimed state bans condemned terminal patients to agony by
depriving them of a deeply personal choice and irrationally
distinguishing between hastening death by terminating treatment and hastening death by lethal prescription. Opponents
replied that the states had rationally chosen to prohibit a
practice that posed serious risk of abuse, could not be confined
to the terminal, and would undermine physician ethics and
trust. They maintained that assisted suicide had long been
distinguished from other end-of-life practices such as terminating treatment and was far more dangerous.

21. 49 F.3d 586.
22. 79 F.3d 790.
23. 80 F.3d 716.
24. See INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 1997, at 831 (50th ed. 1997).
25. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
26. I have analyzed this feature of Cruzan in Susan M. Wolf, PhysicianAssisted Suicide in the Context of Managed Care, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 455, 479
n.115 (1996). The Court reinforced this view in Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258,
2270 (1997), and Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2301 (1997).
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After briefs by the parties and scores of amici, the Supreme Court issued its decisions last June. The Court unanimously reversed both circuit courts, rejecting both the substantive due process and equal protection challenges to the
state bans. With Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the
Court,27 the Justices returned the issue to the states, now free
to legalize or prohibit the practice.
That much is clear. But much else is not. A number of the
Justices explicitly left the door open to future constitutional
challenges on narrower grounds,' inviting debate on what
challenges might pass muster. Indeed, some Justices sounded
quite sympathetic to assisted suicide, though they joined in the
unanimous result.29 At least one of the Justices suggested that
if the legislatures now fail to deal with assisted suicide adequately, the Court may again become involved." And two of
the Justices' opinions suggested a new constitutional right to
adequate pain relief and palliative care."
The unanimity of result thus masked a diversity of
view. The Justices were obviously troubled by this issue.
They properly worried about current end-of-life practices, including termination of life-sustaining treatment, high-dose pain
relief, palliative care, and sedation to unconsciousness. They
were clearly concerned by the risks of error and abuse in

27. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinions in Glucksberg
and Quill in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined;
Justice O'Connor nonetheless wrote her own concurrence, in which Justice
Ginsburg joined and Justice Breyer joined in part; and Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Souter wrote further concurring opinions.
28. See 117 S. Ct. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id at 2309 (Stevens,
J., concurring); id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Souter similarly
concluded, "I do not decide for all time that respondents' claim should not be
recognized." Id. at 2293.
29. See id. at 2290 (Souter, J., concurring) ("There can be no stronger
claim to a physician's assistance than ... when death is imminen .... "); id.
at 2305 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("there are situations in which an interest in
hastening death is legitimate .... [and] entitled to constitutional protection");
id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("our legal tradition may provide greater
support.... [for] a 'right to die with dignity'. ... [including] control over the
manner of death... [and] medical assistance"). Justice O'Connor's acknowledgment and postponement of "the narrower question whether
a... person... experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable
interest" may suggest her sympathies as well. Id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
30. See iU. at 2293 (Souter, J., concurring).
31. See id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2311-12 (Breyer, J.,

concurring).
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legitimizing assisted suicide, but also the risks of suffering
and indignity without this option. Face-to-face with death,
they struggled to maintain a steady gaze.
And now the issue returns to the people, to patients and
physicians, nursing homes and hospices, voters and legislatures. 2 How all of us approach this issue will be deeply affected
by what we have heard from our highest court. The issue is
genuinely hard. The Court has faced it and returned to report.
This Symposium on physician-assisted suicide after
Glucksberg and Quill attempts to interpret the Court's report.
Beyond that it suggests where the state legislatures and the
debate itself should go from here. Eight commentators of diverse expertise offer a rich set of perspectives.
Yale Kamisar's article continues a long history of writing
on assisted suicide and euthanasia, which he began forty years
ago in this law review.33 He analyzes the impact of the Supreme Court decisions on the broader debate over assisted
suicide. Kamisar considers arguments that the Court aided
proponents of assisted suicide by encouraging state legislatures to legalize the practice and leaving the door open for future court challenges. He instead argues that the decisions are
a genuine setback for those proponents. He reviews the status
of the major arguments for assisted suicide post-Glucksberg
and Quill, as well as the status of the principle of double effect
permitting aggressive pain relief. He then focuses on Justice
O'Connor's concurrence to clarify what the Court decided and
did not. Finally, he ventures that the Justices will confront the
assisted suicide issue again in the future, and predicts what
they will do.
Kathryn Tucker, counsel to respondents in Glucksberg and
co-counsel in Quill, takes a different perspective. She maintains that an underground practice of assisted suicide already
occurs so that the choice is between covert, unregulated assisted
suicide and a regulated version. She finds encouragement in
the Justices' opinions, arguing that while the Court returned
32. Numerous bills have been introduced since the start of 1997, both for
and against assisted suicide. See, e.g., S.B. 105, 1st Spec. Sess. (ALa 1997);
H.B. 1669, 19th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1997); H.B. 691, 90th Gen. Ass., 199798 Reg. Sess. (IlM. 1997); H.B. 2531, 77th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1997);
H.P. 663, 118th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 1997); H.B. 1543, 181st Gen. Ct.,
1997 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997); H.B. 109, 64th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1997); S.B.
5654, 55th 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997); A.B. 32, 93d Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1997).
33. See Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed
'Mercy-Killing"Legislation,42 MINN. L. REv. 969 (1958).
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that choice to the states for now, five Justices also left the door
open to future constitutional challenges. Moreover, litigation
based on the state constitutions is another possible avenue to
legalization. Tucker finally focuses on the importance of improving pain relief. She analyzes the suggestion by two Justices that patients may have a federal constitutional right to
pain relief. She also considers whether disciplinary proceedings
against physicians and medical malpractice litigation might be
used to improve pain relief practices.
Howard Brody, a physician and philosopher, examines the
impact of the Court decisions on moral argument over assisted
suicide and on clinical practice. He critiques the circuit courts'
and Supreme Court's handling of two arguments central to the
assisted suicide debate-the moral equivalence argument that
if termination of treatment is moral, assisted suicide must be
as well, and the double effect argument that administering
high-dose pain relief is moral even if it hastens death, as long
as the drugs are given to relieve pain rather than to cause
death deliberately. Brody interprets the Ninth and Second
Circuit opinions to accept moral equivalence but reject double
effect. He then finds that the majority opinion in Glucksberg
avoided dealing with both arguments, but in Quill rejected
moral equivalence, though with reasoning Brody finds unimpressive. Brody finally considers the implications for clinical
practice. He argues that moral equivalence fails to provide
adequate justification for assisted suicide and double effect is
necessary for good care. Thus, the circuit court opinions were a
setback. The Supreme Court at least "wiped the slate clean,"
though without providing a solid analysis.
Robert Burt takes a more psychological perspective on the
Justices' opinions. Superficially they seem to make sense,
unanimously reaffirming a traditional reluctance to impose a
rule no state had yet implemented. But a deeper examination
reveals complexities that belie the seeming unanimity. Burt
finds "something disordered" in these opinions. He concludes
that the emotional impact of assisted suicide and death itself
has led to a degree of incoherence. He compares the death
penalty jurisprudence, finding significant similarities. Those
similarities predict that the Court, if it chooses to hear future
cases on assisted suicide, will pretend to examine the practice
rationally, while in fact refusing to look closely at how it works.
Ezekiel Emanuel, a physician and bioethicist, shifts the debate to the legislatures, arguing that the Supreme Court decisions
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actually failed to leave the door open to future court challenges. He argues that the narrower challenges deferred to
another day by some of the Justices are extremely unlikely, as
states will not sadistically block pain relief and a dignified
death does not require physician assistance with suicide. Focusing, then, on the policy question of whether states should
permit assisted suicide, Emanuel challenges myths supporting
legalization. He argues that the common assumption that patients in pain want this practice disregards the research
showing little causal connection between pain and seeking *assisted suicide. Instead, patients seek assisted suicide mainly
because of depression and fear of being a burden. He further
challenges the notion that one can legalize assisted suicide
while maintaining the prohibition on euthanasia. Emanuel
then proceeds to compare the projected benefits and harms of
legalization, though he finds a need for more data. He concludes by urging empirical evaluation of Oregon's experience in
legalizing asssisted suicide, to inform future debate.
Patricia King and Leslie Wolf also argue in favor of maintaining the prohibitions on assisted suicide and euthanasia.
But they do so by illuminating the circumstances of African
Americans. First, they find in Glucksberg and Quill affirmation
that all patients should be protected, including those in stigmatized groups, in poverty, and without access to good care.
Yet assisted suicide and euthanasia if legalized, they argue,
will necessarily reflect broader social inequalities. Thus, African Americans are right to be particularly skeptical about legalization. King and Wolf trace a history of black lives devalued
in the health care system, blacks disadvantaged, and their
autonomy compromised. African Americans are entitled to
have little confidence that their end-of-life preferences will be
respected. Substantial changes in the health care system
would thus be necessary before legalizing assisted suicide.
Sylvia Law takes a quite different view. She explores how
patients can gain control of death and pain relief, searching for
lessons in the history of patients gaining control of birth and
reproduction in this century. Focusing first on childbirth, she
examines the movement for patient control, how little help patients got from the courts, and the importance of the women's
movement in changing practice. The similar trajectory from
doctor control of sterilization to patient control, however, shows
how professional standards and law can help under some circumstances. Lastly, medical schools' failure to train physicians
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to perform abortions offers an analogy to the failure to train
doctors for end-of-life care. Law suggests that all of these
analogies show the importance of ensuring informed patient
planning, transforming professional attitudes, and improving
medical education. They also suggest that legal change may
alter state policy, but have limited effect on professional practice.
Finally, my own piece examines both the constitutional
litigation and the policy debate. I argue that we have yet to
grapple adequately with a fundamental problem, the role of
data and empiricism. Advocacy for assisted suicide too often
rests on patients' supposed choice between unrelieved agony
and death, plus the claim that physicians already deliberately
cause death through other end-of-life practices. Yet we now
have copious data on terminal care, challenging these arguments. Moreover, a fundamental shift toward pragmatism in
recent thinking about patient care and the role of law should
motivate serious attention to those data. I analyze the treatment of data in the circuit court opinions, the Supreme Court
litigation, and the Justices' opinions. While all seem to concede at a general level that the data are important, particularly empirical information on Dutch practice, the data are
used inconsistently and often ignored on key points. More importantly, none of the players acknowledges this problem. The
debate thus drifts between data and abstraction, the real and
the idealized case. I argue that this leaves the legislatures now
with a tremendous problem. Though a deliberative resolution
of the assisted suicide question would seem to demand attention to clinical realities, deeply entrenched myths may instead
carry the day.
This Symposium thus offers a wide range of views, some
disagreeing and some in accord. The richness of these articles
testifies to the complexity of the assisted suicide problem.
Asking how we should die is surely among the hardest questions. And deciding the role of law becomes taxing in the
shadow of pain and loss. The Justices tried to face these issues. These articles now work to understand what they did
and move forward. The Court ultimately failed to rescue us
from confronting these questions. As assisted suicide returns
to the state house, the ballot box, and the bedside, we all once
again face death.

